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COMMENTS
PROTECTING THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANT
DETAINEES: USING COVID-19 TO CREATE
A NEW ANALOGY
Liamarie Quinde*
While the Supreme Court has defined certain constitutional protections
for incarcerated individuals, the Court has never clearly defined the due
process rights of immigrant detainees in the United States. Instead, the
Supreme Court defers to the due process protections set by Congress when
enacting U.S. immigration law. Increasingly, the federal courts defer to
Congress and the Executive’s plenary power over immigration law and
enforcement. This has resulted in little intervention in immigration matters
by the federal courts, causing the difference between immigration detention
and criminal incarceration to diminish in both organization and appearance.
Immigration detention, however, is a form of civil detention and is legally
distinct from criminal incarceration. This distinction is important because
the federal courts traditionally approach civil detention with a scrutinizing
eye. Civil detainees receive certain Fifth Amendment protections not
available to the criminally convicted, namely that their detention cannot
amount to punishment.
The consequences of lacking a clear definition of immigrant detainees’
due process rights became far more apparent during the COVID-19
pandemic. As COVID-19 infections spread and detention and confinement
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of Virginia, B.A. 2016. Many thanks to Professor Erin Delaney without whose guidance,
review, and expertise, this Comment would not have been possible. I am also grateful to the
student editors of the Journal of Criminal and Criminology for their feedback and review, and
to the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund for championing the civil
rights of immigrants in the United States.

369

370

QUINDE

[Vol. 112

conditions became more perilous, immigrant detainees relied on habeas
corpus petitions to challenge the conditions of their confinement and seek
release. However, several federal courts concluded that habeas was an
inappropriate vehicle through which to challenge conditions of immigration
detention, reflecting a long-standing circuit split within the criminal
incarceration context. This Comment argues that courts that denied habeas
petitions for release of immigrant detainees during the COVID-19 pandemic
incorrectly analogized immigration detention to post-conviction criminal
incarceration. This Comment suggests that the COVID-19 pandemic
highlights the need for the federal courts to take a more principled approach
to analyzing the substantive due process rights of immigrant detainees by
drawing analogies to a different stage of the criminal adjudication process:
pretrial detention.
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INTRODUCTION
Immigration detention is a form of civil detention that provides
immigrant detainees constitutional protections against conditions that
amount to punishment.1 However, life-threatening conditions within
immigration detention centers are a growing phenomenon that dramatically
worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic.2 According to a CNN tally of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) data, twenty-one individuals
died in ICE custody in 2020.3 Although only nine of those deaths were linked
to COVID-19,4 the number of total deaths in 2020 was nearly triple the
number of deaths reported in 2019 and the highest annual death toll in fifteen
years, even though the detained population had dropped by a third since
2019.5 As necessitated by the rate at which COVID-19 spread within ICE
detention facilities,6 immigrant detainees filed a mounting number of habeas
petitions beginning in March 2020 arguing that release from detention was
the only remedy sufficient to protect themselves from severe harm or death.7
1
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) (concluding that due process requires
that pretrial detainees cannot be punished, while sentenced inmates can be punished if it is not
cruel and unusual).
2
See Matt Stieb, Everything We Know About the Inhumane Conditions at Migrant
Detention Camps, N.Y. MAG. (July 2, 2019), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/07/theinhumane-conditions-at-migrant-detention-camps.html (likening migrant detention centers to
concentration camps).
3
Catherine E. Shoichet, The Death Toll in ICE Custody Is the Highest It’s Been in 15
Years, CNN (Sept. 30, 2020, 8:11 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/30/us/ice-deathsdetention-2020/index.html [https://perma.cc/98SA-ZRY8].
4
Noelle Smart, Adam Garcia & Nina Siulc, One Year Later, We Still Don’t Know How
Many People in ICE Detention Have Been Exposed to COVID-19, VERA INST. JUST. (Apr. 8,
2021), https://www.vera.org/blog/one-year-later-we-still-dont-know-how-many-people-inice-detention-have-been-exposed-to-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/45PE-X5L5].
5
Immigration Detention and COVID-19, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 14, 2021),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/immigration-detention-and-covid19 [https://perma.cc/Z87S-JLLS].
6
See generally Parsa Erfani, Nishant Uppal, Caroline H. Lee, Ranit Mishori & Katherine
R. Peeler, COVID-19 Testing and Cases in Immigration Detention Centers, April-August
2020, 325 JAMA 182, 182–84 (2021).
7
See e.g., Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2020); Toure
v. Hott, 458 F. Supp. 3d 387, 393 (E.D. Va. 2020); Saillant v. Hoover, 454 F. Supp. 3d 465,
466 (M.D. Pa. 2020); Martinez Franco v. Jennings, 456 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1196 (N.D. Cal.
2020); Bent v. Barr, 445 F. Supp. 3d 408, 413 (N.D. Cal. 2020); Basri v. Barr, 469 F. Supp.
3d 1063, 1066 (D. Colo. 2020); Juan E. M. v. Decker, 458 F. Supp. 3d 244, 247–48 (D.N.J.
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Writs of habeas corpus traditionally provide a remedy to individuals in
custody who want to challenge the legality of their detention.8 Yet several
federal courts denied immigrant detainee habeas petitions during the
COVID-19 pandemic, reasoning that the writ of habeas corpus is only
appropriate where immigrant detainees also challenge their underlying
immigration charges by arguing that the federal government “has no lawful
basis to detain the petitioner” in the first place.9 These courts reasoned that
immigrant petitions for release during the COVID-19 pandemic were
conditions of confinement claims which should instead be brought as civil
rights actions.10 This distinction derives from a long-standing circuit split that
requires criminally incarcerated prisoners to use different procedural vehicles
depending on whether the individual challenges their detention, its duration,
or the conditions of their confinement.11 However, the typical remedy for
civil rights actions is damages, which is an insufficient remedy for immigrant
detainees seeking release.12
This Comment argues that by denying immigrant habeas petitions for
release, the federal courts may incorrectly be analogizing immigrant
detainees to post-conviction, criminally incarcerated individuals. In doing so,
the courts fail to provide the substantive due process protections that are

2020); Awshana v. Adducci, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1046 (E.D. Mich. 2020); Peregrino
Guevara v. Witte, No. 20-CV-01200, 2020 WL 6940814, at *1 (W.D. La. Nov. 17, 2020);
Gomez-Arias v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 20-CV-00857, 2020 WL 6384209, at *1
(D.N.M Oct. 30, 2020); Ndudzi v. Perez, 490 F. Supp. 3d 1176, 1177 (S.D. Tex. 2020);
O.M.G. v. Wolf, 474 F. Supp. 3d 274, 277 (D.D.C. 2020); Njuguna v. Staiger, No. 20-CV00560, 2020 WL 3425289, at *1 (W.D. La. June 3, 2020); Mohammed S. v. Tritten, No. 20CV-783, 2020 WL 2750109, at *2 (D. Minn. May 27, 2020); Matos v. Lopez Vega, No. 20CIV-60784, 2020 WL 2298775, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 6, 2020); Favi v. Kolitwenzew, No. 20CV-2087, 2020 WL 2114566, at *1 (C.D. Ill. May 4, 2020); Vazquez Barrera v. Wolf, 455 F.
Supp. 3d 330, 333 (S.D. Tex. 2020); Dawson v. Asher, No. C20-409, 2020 WL 1704324, at
*1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 8, 2020).
8
I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).
9
E.g., Basri, 469 F. Supp. 3d at 1067; see also Toure, 458 F. Supp. 3d at 398–99 (holding
that the Fourth Circuit has declined to recognize conditions of confinement challenges under
§ 2241, which should instead be brought as § 1983 or Bivens actions).
10
See cases cited supra note 9.
11
Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006); see also Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S.
749, 750 (2004).
12
Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 892 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that civil rights actions
“cannot be used to seek release from illegal physical confinement”); Glaus v. Anderson, 408
F.3d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 2005) (concluding that “release is not available under Bivens” civil
rights actions for those confined by federal authorities).
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traditionally afforded to individuals in civil detention.13 Part I provides an
overview of the governing habeas corpus statutes, the current circuit split
regarding whether habeas can be used to challenge conditions of
confinement, and how the circuit split has impacted immigrant detainees. As
applied to habeas petitions by immigrant detainees seeking release due to
unsafe living conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic, the split turns on
whether these petitions should be classified as conditions of confinement
claims and, if so, whether those claims are cognizable under habeas. Part II
analyzes federal court opinions that denied immigrant habeas petitions
during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic and demonstrates how courts
may implicitly rely on inaccurate analogies that compare detained
immigrants to post-conviction criminally incarcerated individuals. However,
Part III acknowledges the danger of pushing the federal courts away from
analogizing immigration detention to the criminal legal system because
federal courts traditionally defer to the federal government on immigration
matters. To avoid overcorrecting and risking further erosion of substantive
due process rights for immigrant detainees, this Comment argues that federal
courts could analogize to a different stage of the criminal adjudication
process: pretrial criminal detention. Although no analogy is perfect, this
Comment concludes that this approach would allow federal courts to uphold
the principal purpose of habeas corpus while simultaneously protecting the
substantive due process rights of immigrant detainees.
I. SITUATING DETAINED IMMIGRANTS IN CURRENT LAW
The writ of habeas corpus is a foundational pillar of the American legal
system,14 but its application to the immigration detention system has been
less than consistent. This Part first explains the current federal statutes
governing the writ of habeas corpus petitions and how the writ is applied in
immigration detention. This Part then explores the reasoning behind the
circuit split on whether habeas corpus can be used to challenge conditions of
confinement within the criminal legal system context. Finally, this Part
demonstrates how the circuit split has impacted immigrant detainee habeas
petitions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

13
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) (concluding that due process requires
that pretrial detainees cannot be punished, while sentenced inmates can be punished if it is not
cruel and unusual).
14
See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001).
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A. THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND ITS APPLICATION IN
IMMIGRATION LAW

Both non-enemy aliens and U.S. citizens have historically used the writ
of habeas corpus to challenge and review the legality of both civil and
criminal executive detention.15 Three statutes currently govern habeas
corpus. First, state prisoners can file a habeas petition if they believe they are
in custody in “violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States”
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but only after exhausting state court remedies.16
Second, federal prisoners wanting to vacate their sentence or conviction or
who seek resentencing may file a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.17
Third, a federal prisoner can file a post-conviction habeas petition under 28
U.S.C. § 224118 to challenge the execution of their sentence or if they can
show the remedy of changing their conviction or sentence under § 2255 is
“inadequate or ineffective.”19 In the criminal incarceration context, § 2241
actions generally challenge “the administration of parole, computation of a
prisoner’s sentence by prison officials, prison disciplinary actions, prison
transfers, type of detention and prison conditions.”20 Conversely, section
2255 claims are used to challenge the legality of the sentence imposed.21 The
writ, as applied in the criminal incarceration context, however, cannot be
mapped onto civil immigration because immigrant detainees can only access
the writ through § 2241.22
The writ of habeas corpus is the main vehicle through which immigrant
detainees can challenge the constitutionality of their detention. The REAL
ID Act of 200523 greatly limited judicial review of habeas petitions by
immigrant detainees challenging final orders of removal, deportation, and

15

Id. at 302–03.
28 U.S.C. § 2254.
17
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-37.000 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-937000-federal-habeas-corpus [https://perma.cc/87GW-87W8].
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Chambers v. United States,
106 F.3d 472, 474–75 (2d Cir. 1997)).
21
Chambers, 106 F.3d at 474–75 (explaining that § 2255 actions are appropriate where
“[a] petitioner seek[s] to challenge the legality of the imposition of a sentence by a court.”);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
22
U.S. CTS., PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241 1 (2017),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/AO_242_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/QWY5-TBZT];
see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001) (concluding that immigrant detainees
may bring § 2241(c)(3) petitions challenging their custody if they are detained in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States).
23
REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).
16
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exclusion,24 although it did not impact an immigrant’s ability to challenge the
length or conditions of detention.25 In fact, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic,
immigrant detainees used habeas to challenge extended detention or failure
to receive a bond hearing while awaiting adjudication of their immigration
charges or removal.26 Since the start of the pandemic, immigrant detainees—
especially those with preexisting medical conditions27—argued that
conditions within ICE facilities during the pandemic violated their
constitutional right to substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment.28
Relying on the writ of habeas corpus, these immigrant detainees sought
temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions seeking immediate
release, or alternatives to detention.29
While acknowledging the unprecedented dangers of the COVID-19
pandemic, federal courts are split on whether to classify immigrant habeas
petitions for release as challenges to conditions of confinement or challenges
to the fact or duration of detention.30 Traditionally, an individual in custody

24
Thoung v. United States, 913 F.3d 999, 1001 (10th Cir. 2019) (explaining that the
REAL ID Act of 2005 limited judicial review of habeas petitions challenging final orders of
removal for immigrants).
25
See, e.g., Kellici v. Gonzales, 472 F.3d 416, 419–20 (6th Cir. 2006) (concluding that
when petitioner solely challenges his or her detention through habeas, and not the underlying
removal, the case cannot be transferred to the court of appeals); Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414
F.3d 442, 446 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005) (“An alien challenging the legality of his detention still may
petition for habeas corpus.”); see also H.R. Rep. No 109-72, at 176 (2005) (Conf. Rep.)
(“[REAL ID Act] section 106 will not preclude habeas review over challenges to detention
that are independent of challenges to removal orders.”).
26
See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688 (establishing that a noncitizen may raise “statutory
or constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention” through habeas); Demore v.
Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (holding that deportable aliens can be detained while their
immigration charges are adjudicated where respondent filed habeas petition challenging the
constitutionality of his mandatory detention); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 845, 847–
48 (2018) (concluding that although the federal government must provide a bond hearing to
detained immigrants, periodic review is not required).
27
E.g., Favi v. Kolitwenzew, No. 20-CV-2087, 2020 WL 2114566, at *5 (C.D. Ill. May
4, 2020).
28
See cases cited supra note 7.
29
See cases cited supra note 7. In the alternative, immigrant detainees have also argued
that ICE detention violates their constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment, id., or that the detention violates § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. Id.
30
Compare Njuguna v. Staiger, No. 20-CV-00560, 2020 WL 3425289, at *5 (W.D. La.
June 3, 2020) (“If no set of conditions is sufficient to protect a detainee’s constitutional rights,
his claim for relief is cognizable in habeas.”), with Ndudzi v. Perez, 490 F. Supp. 3d 1176,
1181 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (concluding that habeas action are only appropriate when a litigant
challenges the “legal basis of their confinement and seek release from detention”).
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brings a petition for habeas corpus when seeking release.31 If an individual
in custody wants to challenge the conditions of their confinement, a civil
rights claim seeking monetary damages is used.32 During the COVID-19
pandemic, some courts held that habeas petitions for release brought as
challenges to the conditions of confinement within ICE detention were in fact
conditions of confinement claims more properly brought as civil rights
actions, regardless of the remedy sought.33 But civil rights actions require the
detainee to demonstrate that a federal agent acted with objective “deliberate
indifference” to their safety and well-being, which is a difficult standard for
immigrant detainees to meet.34 Further, civil rights actions are traditionally
limited to monetary, not injunctive, relief, making them inappropriate for
federal immigrant detainees seeking release from confinement.35 However,
other federal courts have allowed immigrant detainees to use the writ of
habeas corpus to seek release from confinement during the pandemic because
the petitioners challenged the “fact or duration of [their] physical
imprisonment,” and sought “immediate . . . or a speedier release.”36

31

Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (“Challenges to the validity of any
confinement or to the particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus”).
32
Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006) (“An inmate’s challenge to the
circumstances of his confinement, however, may be brought under § 1983.”).
33
See, e.g., Toure v. Hott, 458 F. Supp. 3d 387, 400–01 (E.D. Va. 2020) (holding that a
habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 does not serve as a proper remedy when challenging
conditions of confinement in immigration detention in light of the coronavirus pandemic);
Ndudzi, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 1180 (same); Matos v. Lopez Vega, No. 20-CIV-60784, 2020 WL
2298775, at *6 (S.D. Fla. May 6, 2020) (same); Gayle v. Meade, No. 20-21553, 2020 WL
1949737, at *25–26 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2020) (same); Benavides v. Gartland, No. 20-CV-46,
2020 WL 1914916, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 2020) (same); Dawson v. Asher, No. 20-409,
2020 WL 1704324, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 8, 2020) (same).
34
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1864 (2017) (referencing civil rights actions which
are filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971)).
35
See Patel v. Santana, 348 F. App’x 974, 976 (5th Cir. 2009) (explaining that injunctive
relief against the Bureau of Prisons is “a form of relief that would not be proper
under Bivens”).
36
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498 (1973); see also Hope v. Warden York Cnty.
Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 324 (3d Cir. 2020); Vazquez Barrera v. Wolf, 455 F. Supp. 3d 330, 336
(S.D. Tex. 2020); Awshana v. Adducci, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1047 (E.D. Mich. 2020); Bent
v. Barr, 445 F. Supp. 3d 408, 413 (N.D. Cal. 2020); Juan E. M. v. Decker, 458 F. Supp. 3d
244, 253 (D.N.J. 2020); Peregrino Guevara v. Witte, No. 20-CV-01200, 2020 WL 6940814,
at *4 (W.D. La. Nov. 17, 2020); Gomez-Arias v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 20-CV00857, 2020 WL 6384209, at *2, *3 (D.N.M. Oct. 30, 2020); Njuguna v. Staiger, No. 20-CV00560, 2020 WL 3425289, at *5 (W.D. La. June 3, 2020); Mohammed S. v. Tritten, No. 20CV-783, 2020 WL 2750109, at *2 (D. Minn. May 27, 2020); Favi v. Kolitwenzew, No. 20CV-2087, 2020 WL 2114566, at *5 (C.D. Ill. May 4, 2020).
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The Supreme Court has not definitively stated whether conditions of
confinement claims are cognizable under habeas, resulting in a circuit split
between eleven federal appellate courts.37 Their disagreement derives from
Preiser v. Rodriguez, in which two New York state prisoners brought a civil
rights action (42 U.S.C. § 1983) and a habeas action alleging they were
unconstitutionally deprived of good-conduct-time credits which, if
reinstated, would result in their immediate release.38 The Court explained that
the purpose of habeas “is to secure release from illegal custody.”39 Since the
prisoners alleged that their continued confinement was illegal, their
complaint fell squarely within the scope of habeas.40 Section 1983 claims,
however, were traditionally considered appropriate when a prisoner
challenged their prison conditions.41 The Court left open whether conditions
of confinement claims were cognizable under habeas, stating habeas may be
available “[w]hen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional
restraints during his lawful custody.”42
Since Preiser, the Supreme Court has avoided settling whether
conditions of confinement claims are cognizable under habeas.43 Early cases
focused on situations in which civil rights actions were inappropriate because
the claims struck at the core of habeas corpus. In Heck v. Humphrey, the
Court found that where “establishing the basis for the damages claim

37

Compare Melot v. Bergami, 970 F.3d 596, 598–99 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding conditions
of confinement claims are not cognizable under habeas); Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710,
714 (6th Cir. 2004) (same); Robinson v. Sherrod, 631 F.3d 839, 841 (7th Cir. 2011) (same);
Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467, 468 (8th Cir. 2014) (same); Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d
922, 931 n.6 (9th Cir. 2016) (same); Palma-Salazar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir.
2012) (same); Gomez v. United States, 899 F.2d 1124, 1127 (11th Cir. 1990) (same), with
Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that conditions of
confinement claims are cognizable under habeas); Brennan v. Cunningham, 813 F.2d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 1987) (same); Hope, 972 F.3d at 324–25 (same); Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d
Cir. 2001) (holding that § 2241 habeas petitions can be used to challenge “the execution of a
federal prisoner’s sentence, including such matters as . . . type of detention and prison
conditions.”).
38
Preiser, 411 U.S. at 476–77.
39
Id. at 484.
40
Id. at 487.
41
Id. at 499; see also Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (“Challenges to the
validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas
corpus”) (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500).
42
Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499; see also Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus,
83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1084 (1970).
43
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 526 n.6 (1979) (“[W]e leave to another day the
question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions
of confinement”); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1863 (2017) (same).
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necessarily demonstrates the invalidity of the conviction”44 a § 1983 action
was inappropriate “unless . . . the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.”45 In Edward v. Balisok, the Court addressed challenges to
prison disciplinary procedures by holding that habeas was the only vehicle
for an inmate seeking declaratory relief and monetary damages if the
prisoner’s success would “necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment
imposed.”46 Whether “directly through an injunction compelling speedier
release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies
the unlawfulness of the State’s custody,” the Court reframed that habeas was
the sole remedy for prisoners seeking to invalidate the fact or duration of
their confinement.47 Finally, in Ziglar v. Abassi, the Supreme Court stated
that it remained an open question whether immigrant detainees could
challenge the conditions of confinement within detention using the writ of
habeas corpus.48 Together, these cases established that civil rights actions
cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of confinement but did not
address whether habeas is appropriate to challenge conditions of confinement
for the incarcerated or detained.49
B. ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE APPROPRIATE USE
OF HABEAS CORPUS

The use of habeas corpus by immigrant detainees seeking release during
the COVID-19 pandemic revived a long-standing circuit split on whether the
courts should classify habeas petitions for release from confinement as
conditions of confinement claims or fact or duration claims, and if the courts
classified these claims as conditions of confinement claims, whether these
claims are cognizable under habeas.50 However, as demonstrated below, the
overwhelming majority of precedent on this issue derives from the criminal
legal system and not the immigration system.
Three main “camps” of reasoning define the circuit split. Camp 1 seeks
to avoid excessive prisoner litigation.51 This line of reasoning draws on the
44

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994).
Id. at 487.
46
See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997).
47
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005).
48
Ziglar v. Abassi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862–63 (2017).
49
See id.; Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81–82.
50
See cases cited supra note 36.
51
Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 932 (9th Cir. 2016) (concluding that Congress
intended the PLRA to make § 1983 the exclusive remedy for prisoner suits concerning life in
prison); Jones v. Smith, 720 F.3d 142, 145 (2d Cir. 2013) (discussing how the PLRA’s three45
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Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA)52 and the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),53 which both restrict
prisoner access to litigation remedies, to conclude that conditions of
confinement claims are not cognizable under habeas.54 Camp 2 defines
access to habeas based on the remedy sought by the petitioner, since habeas
has historically been narrowly applied to claims in which the remedy sought
is release.55 Finally, Camp 3 finds conditions of confinement claims
cognizable under habeas, reasoning that the distinction between conditions
of confinement claims and fact or duration claims is unnecessary and
concluding that the root of the issue for both types of claims is the same.56
1. Camp 1: Very Limited Access to Habeas for Prisoners
Camp 1 distinguishes between conditions of confinement claims and
fact or duration claims because of the statutory limitations to challenges to
conditions of confinement created by the PLRA and AEDPA.57 In Nettles v.
Grounds, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress intended to “reduce the
quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits” when enacting the PLRA
by requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies for all suits related to
prison life other than those at the core of habeas.58 This includes conditions
of confinement claims. The Ninth Circuit found that Congress’s purpose in
strike rule limits civil actions by prisoners that are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.”); Davis v. Fechtel, 150 F.3d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 1998)
(“[T]he legislative history of the PLRA indicates that Congress was interested in discouraging
suits involving frivolous challenges to prison conditions.”).
52
42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
53
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(d); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)–(f).
54
Michael M. O’Hear, Not So Sweet: Questions Raised by Sixteen Years of the PLRA and
AEDPA, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 223, 223 (2012); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA), LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/antiterrorism_and_
effective_death_penalty_act_of_1996_(aedpa) [https://perma.cc/2DSP-Y463].
55
Nettles, 830 F.3d at 931; Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467, 469–70 (8th Cir. 2014);
Palma-Salazar v. Davis, 667 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 2012); Melot v. Bergami, 970 F.3d
596, 599 (5th Cir. 2020); Robinson v. Sherrod, 631 F.3d 839, 841 (7th Cir. 2011).
56
Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1035–36 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that conditions of
confinement claims were cognizable under habeas); Brennan v. Cunningham, 813 F.2d 1, 4
(1st Cir. 1987) (same); Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that § 2241
habeas petitions can be used to challenge “the execution of a federal prisoner’s sentence,
including such matters as . . . type of detention and prison conditions.”); see also Hope v.
Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2020) (finding that habeas is properly
used to challenge conditions of confinement where “the deprivation of rights is such that it
necessarily impacts the fact or length of detention.”).
57
Nettles, 830 F.3d at 932; Jones v. Smith, 720 F.3d 142, 145–46 (2d Cir. 2013); Davis
v. Fechtel, 150 F.3d 486, 488–89 (5th Cir. 1998).
58
Nettles, 830 F.3d at 932 (quoting Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002)).
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passing the PLRA would be frustrated if state prisoners could evade
administrative remedies by bringing their conditions of confinement
challenges under habeas.59 Similarly, the Second Circuit explained “that a
habeas petition seeking to overturn a criminal conviction or sentence was not
a ‘civil action’ for purposes of the PLRA.”60 As defined by the Fifth Circuit,
while “habeas corpus proceedings are technically civil actions,” the “label is
gross and inexact” because “the proceeding is unique.”61 A habeas petition
“involve[s] someone’s liberty, rather than mere civil liability.”62 The Second
Circuit similarly reasoned that Congress’s intent in passing the statute was to
curtail an increase in frivolous civil actions focused on “insufficient storage
locker space, a defective haircut by the prison barber,” or “being served
creamy peanut butter instead of chunky.”63 The Second Circuit even pointed
to a floor statement by one of the PLRA’s sponsors which reinforced that it
was not written to limit access to habeas as a vehicle to challenge a conviction
or sentence.64 Additionally, two days before passing the PLRA, Congress
enacted the AEDPA which substantially limited habeas petitions under
§§ 2254 and 2255.65 According to Camp 1, joint passage of the PLRA and
AEDPA reinforced that Congress did not intend for civil rights actions and
habeas petitions to be used interchangeably within the criminal legal
system.66

59

Id. (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489–90 (1973)).
Jones, 720 F.3d at 145 (citing Reyes v. Keane, 90 F.3d 676, 678 (2d Cir. 1996),
overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997)).
61
Davis, 150 F.3d at 488 (citing Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293–94 (1969)).
62
Id. at 490; cf. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 440 (1995) (comparing stakes
involved in habeas proceedings to civil cases in the context of the standard of review required).
63
Jones, 720 F.3d at 147; see, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S14,413 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995)
(remarks of Sen. Bob Dole); id. at 418 (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl); 141 CONG. REC. S14,627
(daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid).
64
Id. (citing 141 CONG. REG. S14,418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Orin
Hatch)).
65
Id.
66
See Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 932 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Davis, 150 F.3d at
490 (concluding that Congress did not intend for exhaustion requirement in PLRA to apply to
habeas when it simultaneously passed the PLRA and AEDPA); McIntosh v. U.S. Parole
Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[H]abeas actions are not the type of abusive,
prison condition litigation that Congress sought to curtail in enacting the PLRA.”); Blair-Bey
v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (differentiating between civil actions and
habeas petitions as related to the PLRA because in a habeas proceeding “someone’s custody,
rather than mere civil liability, is at stake.” (quoting O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 440
(1995)).
60
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2. Camp 2: Habeas Can be Accessed Based on the Remedy Sought
Camp 2 differentiates between conditions of confinement claims and
fact or duration claims based on the remedy sought. This line of reasoning
narrowly defines habeas to apply only to those claims in which an individual
in custody seeks release. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that a civil rights
action (42 U.S.C. § 1983) was the exclusive vehicle for claims brought by
state prisoners that, even if successful, would fail to invalidate the criminal
judgment itself.67 For example, a prisoner’s habeas petition challenging a
disciplinary proceeding would be barred unless the prisoner specifically
sought to challenge the conviction itself or the length of the prisoner’s
sentence.68 Subsequently, the Supreme Court explained that “when a
prisoner’s claim would not ‘necessarily spell speedier release,’ that claim
does not lie at ‘the core of habeas corpus’” and should be brought as a civil
rights action.69 When a federal prisoner challenged his conditions of
confinement after being forcibly restrained to his bed for thirty hours, the
Eighth Circuit also held that habeas was an inappropriate remedy.70 Citing
Preiser, the Eighth Circuit concluded that because the petitioner challenged
the conditions of his confinement and did not seek early release, habeas was
inappropriate71 because “[i]t is the substance of the relief sought which
counts.”72 Taken together, these rulings suggest that access to habeas should
be limited to situations where the remedy sought by a prisoner is release.73
The definition of release from confinement can get complicated when a
petitioner simply seeks a change in his or her type of confinement.74 In
Palma-Salazar v. Davis, an alleged leader of the Sinaloa Cartel filed a habeas
petition challenging his confinement at a maximum-security prison in
Colorado and sought lower-security confinement.75 Having previously held
that a request for change in type of confinement constituted a conditions of
67

Nettles, 830 F.3d at 928 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)).
Id. at 929 (quoting Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754–55 (2004)) (concluding
that use of habeas was only appropriate where a prisoner sought “a judgment at odds with [the
prisoner’s] conviction or with the State’s calculation of time to be served.”).
69
Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 535 n.13 (2011) (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544
U.S. 74, 82 (2005)).
70
Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467, 468–69 (8th Cir. 2014).
71
Id. at 469–70 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973)).
72
Kruger v. Erickson, 77 F.3d 1071, 1073 (8th Cir. 1996).
73
Nettles, 830 F.3d at 930–31 (“[H]abeas is available only for state prisoner claims that
lie at the core of habeas (and is the exclusive remedy for such claims), while § 1983 is the
exclusive remedy for state prisoner claims that do not lie at the core of habeas.”).
74
Confinement can range from detention within a high security prison to work release
programs to home arrest.
75
Palma-Salazar v. Davis, 667 F.3d 1031, 1033 (10th Cir. 2012).
68
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confinement claim, the circuit was unwilling to extend habeas to claims that
did not shorten the duration of confinement.76 Even if granted lower-level
security confinement, Palma-Salazar would still be imprisoned and would
not gain any increase in his liberty. The Fifth Circuit similarly established a
“bright-line rule” that “if a favorable determination of the prisoner’s claim
would not automatically entitle him to accelerated release, then the proper
vehicle is a civil rights suit.”77 When a federal prisoner filed a habeas petition
seeking home confinement through an elderly release program, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that habeas was an improper vehicle because the
individual’s liberty had not changed.78 The Seventh Circuit articulated yet
another way to differentiate between changes in types of confinement:
If the prisoner is seeking what can fairly be described as a quantum change in the level
of custody—whether outright freedom, or freedom subject to the limited reporting and
financial constraints of bond or parole or probation, or the run of the prison in contrast
to the approximation to solitary confinement that is disciplinary segregation—then
habeas corpus is his remedy. But if he is seeking a different program or location or
environment, then he is challenging the conditions rather than the fact of his
confinement and his remedy is under civil rights law, even if, as will usually be the
case, the program or location or environment that he is challenging is more restrictive
than the alternative that he seeks.79

These courts agree that the writ of habeas corpus requires a change in
the level of freedom experienced by an individual in custody.

76

Id. at 1035 (quoting United States v. Garcia, 470 F.3d 1001, 1003 (10th Cir. 2006)).
Melot v. Bergami, 970 F.3d 596, 599 (5th Cir. 2020); see also Rice v. Gonzalez, 985
F.3d 1069, 1069–70 (5th Cir. 2021) (mem.) (concluding that a pretrial detainee’s petition for
release due to unsafe COVID-19 conditions within state prison was improperly brought under
habeas corpus because the conditions within the facility did not “impugn the underlying legal
basis for . . . his confinement.”).
78
Melot, 970 F.3d at 599 (citing Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1997));
see also Robinson v. Sherrod, 631 F.3d 839, 841 (7th Cir. 2011) (“When there isn’t even an
indirect effect on duration of punishment . . . we’ll adhere to our long-standing view that
habeas corpus is not a permissible route for challenging prison conditions.”); Glaus v.
Anderson, 408 F.3d 382, 386 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that when a prisoner challenges the
“conditions under which he is being held” a § 1983 or Bivens claim, not a habeas petition, is
appropriate).
79
Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1991).
77
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3. Camp 3: Conditions of Confinement Claims are Cognizable Under
Habeas
Camp 3 concludes that conditions of confinement claims are cognizable
under habeas.80 The D.C. Circuit explained that conditions of confinement
claims are cognizable under habeas because the prisoner is deprived of a
constitutional right both in conditions of confinement claims and in fact or
duration claims.81 Thus, access to habeas for both types of claims is
consistent with the original purpose of habeas as a remedy for “unlawful
executive detention.”82 The D.C. Circuit also stated that other circuits
fundamentally misunderstood Preiser which created a “habeas-channeling
rule, not a habeas-limiting rule.”83 In Preiser, the Supreme Court stated that
“claims lying at the ‘core’ of the writ must be brought in habeas” but
expressly disclaimed restricting habeas.84
C. COVID-19 SPECIFIC CASES

While limiting access to habeas for criminally incarcerated individuals
has its justifications, blanketly and incorrectly applying those same
limitations to civil immigrant detainees during a pandemic is not only
constitutionally unjustified, but also has substantial consequences on
immigrant detainees’ health. The communal nature of immigration detention
facilities makes social distancing nearly impossible.85 Harvard Medical
80

Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that conditions of
confinement claims were cognizable under habeas); Brennan v. Cunningham, 813 F.2d 1, 4–
5 (1st Cir. 1987) (same); Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that
§ 2241 habeas petitions can be used to challenge “the execution of a federal prisoner’s
sentence, including such matters as . . . type of detention and prison conditions.”); Hope v.
Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2020) (finding that habeas is properly
used to challenge conditions of confinement where “the deprivation of rights is such that it
necessarily impacts the fact or length of detention.”).
81
Aamer, 742 F.3d at 1036 (explaining that in both situations “the petitioner contends that
some aspect of his confinement has deprived him of a right to which he is entitled while in
custody.”).
82
Id. (quoting Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008)).
83
Id. at 1037 (citing Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 499–500 (1973)).
84
Id. (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499–500); see also Dickerson v. Walsh, 750 F.2d 150,
153–54 (1st Cir. 1984); Miller v. United States, 564 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1977).
85
Noelle Smart & Adam Garcia, Tracking COVID-19 in Immigration Detention: A
Dashboard of ICE Data, VERA INST. JUST. (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.vera.org/trackingcovid-19-in-immigration-detention [https://perma.cc/Z6HL-PG73]; see also Timothy
Williams & Danielle Ivory, Chicago’s Jail Is Top U.S. Hot Spot as Virus Spreads Behind
Bars, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/us/coronaviruscook-county-jail-chicago.html [https://perma.cc/FRA8-NERB] (“Concerns about the virus’s
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School studied COVID-19 case rates at ICE facilities from April through
August 2020 and found a higher monthly case rate than the national
average.86 Additionally, an epidemiological model developed by the Vera
Institute concluded that the actual number of positive cases in ICE facilities
as of mid-May 2020 may have been fifteen times higher than the numbers
reported by ICE.87 As of January 17, 2022, 33,536 people in immigration
detention have tested positive for COVID-19.88 ICE continues to omit from
its reporting COVID-19 cases amongst its full-time and contract staff
entirely, making it highly likely that ICE has inaccurately reported COVID19 cases within ICE facilities.89
At the start of the pandemic, ICE issued new safety guidelines for its
facilities that called for cohorting suspected COVID-19 cases.90 ICE asserted
that its practice of cohorting detainees who might have been exposed to
COVID-19 was in line with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) guidelines.91 CDC guidelines, however, clearly state that “cohorting
individuals with suspected COVID-19 is not recommended due to [the] high
risk of transmission from infected to uninfected individuals.”92 Yet ICE
continues the practice of quarantining suspected COVID-19 cases together
which has resulted in real harm.93 For example, July 2020 data from ICE and
spread have prompted authorities across the country to release thousands of inmates, many of
whom were awaiting trial or serving time for nonviolent crimes. But those measures have not
prevented a dizzying pace of infection among a population in which social distancing is
virtually impossible and access to soap and water is not guaranteed.”).
86
Erfani, supra note 6, at 183.
87
Smart & Garcia, supra note 85.
88
Id.
89
FREEDOM FOR IMMIGRANTS, CONDITIONS IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION: QUARTERLY
ANALYSIS & UPDATE 6 (2021), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a33042eb078691c386
e7bce/t/605e0faad231f61abb610ad7/1616777130314/March+Conditions+Report+_FINAL
.pdf [https://perma.cc/SCQ5-FR6Y].
90
FREEDOM FOR IMMIGRANTS, supra note 89, at 5. Cohorting refers to the practice of
quarantining immigrant detainees in the same detention cells or sleeping facilities who were
exposed to someone who tested positive for COVID-19 and who are at risk of developing
symptoms. Jude Joffe-Block & Valeria Fernández, ICE Tactics to Limit Spread of COVID-19
in Detention Centers Stir Controversy, ARIZ. CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Apr. 16,
2020), https://azcir.org/news/2020/04/16/ice-cohorting-immigrant-detention/ [https://perma
.cc/82V5-2YNW].
91
Joffe-Block & Fernández, supra note 90.
92
Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in
Correctional and Detention Facilities, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correction-detention/guidancecorrectional-detention.html#QuarantiningCloseContacts [https://perma.cc/55EL-5GZ4] (last
updated June 9, 2021).
93
See FREEDOM FOR IMMIGRANTS, supra note 89, at 5.
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the Texas Department of State Health Services found that Texas ICE
facilities were fifteen times more likely to experience a COVID-19 outbreak
than the rest of the state’s population.94 The agency also continued transfers
of immigrant detainees between facilities during the pandemic which was the
main driver of the spread of COVID-19 infections in immigration
detention.95 Further, it is now apparent that COVID-19 has long-term health
implications for some patients of all ages (with or without co-morbidities).96
Unsurprisingly, immigrants sought temporary release from ICE detention
facilities as fears of severe illness or death from COVID-19 grew, and, in
response, used the writ of habeas corpus to challenge the unsafe conditions
within the ICE facilities.97
ICE initially stated in March 2021 that it was each state’s responsibility
to distribute vaccines for immigrant detainees within its borders.98 Despite
the existence of the COVID-19 vaccine, however, a report by the Intercept
in June 2021 found that there was a six-fold increase in COVID-19 cases in
ICE detention facilities between March and May of 2021 that coincided with
“ICE’s decision to [do] [inter-facility] transfer[s]” and refusal to provide
vaccines to detainees.99 The Biden administration took steps in August 2021
to increase vaccinations of immigrant detainees, announcing that it will offer
vaccines to migrants in custody along the Mexico border.100 As of January
14, 2022, 48,246 immigrant detainees had received at least one shot of a
COVID-19 vaccine.101 The vaccination efforts coincide, however, with
growing number of COVID-19 infections amongst immigrant detainees as
94

Immigration Detention and COVID-19, supra note 5.
Lisa Riordan Seville & Hannah Rappleye, ICE Keeps Transferring Detainees Around
the Country, Leading to COVID-19 Outbreaks, NBC NEWS (May 31, 2020, 5:08 AM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/ice-keeps-transferring-detainees-around-countryleading-covid-19-outbreaks-n1212856 [https://perma.cc/B55R-7TE9]; see also FREEDOM FOR
IMMIGRANTS, supra note 89, at 10–11.
96
Long Haulers: Why Some People Experience Long-term Coronavirus Symptoms, UC
Davis Health (Feb. 8, 2021), https://health.ucdavis.edu/coronavirus/covid-19-information/
covid-19-long-haulers.html [https://perma.cc/5NMJ-XCS3].
97
See cases cited supra note 7.
98
See FREEDOM FOR IMMIGRANTS, supra note 89, at 9.
99
Felipe De La Hoz, Recent COVID-19 Spike in Immigration Detention Was a Problem
of ICE’s Own Making, INTERCEPT (June 20, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2021/
06/20/covid-asylum-detention-ice/ [https://perma.cc/AD7S-39JW].
100
Camilo Montoya-Galvez, ICE Ramps Up Vaccination of Immigrants in U.S. Custody,
but Thousands Have Refused, CBS NEWS (Aug. 13, 2021, 3:25 PM), https://www.cbsnews
.com/news/ice-ramps-up-vaccination-of-immigrants-in-u-s-custody-but-thousands-haverefused/ [https://perma.cc/EUS4-NCVE].
101
Camilo Montoya-Galvez, Coronavirus Infections Inside U.S. Immigration Detention
Centers Surge By 520% in 2022, CBS NEWS (Jan. 14, 2022, 4:44 PM), https://www.cbsnews
.com/news/immigration-detention-covid-cases-surge/ [https://perma.cc/B6NB-4RWQ].
95
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the ICE detainee population has grown to 25,000 in August 2021––a 70%
increase since the beginning of the Biden administration.102
In response to the crisis in ICE detention facilities and to circumvent the
criminal legal system’s restricted approach to habeas in August 2020, the
Third Circuit concluded that conditions of confinement claims brought by
immigrant detainees were cognizable under habeas because of the unique
challenges posed by COVID-19.103 In Hope v. Warden York County Prison,
immigrant detainees filed a habeas petition seeking release from confinement
during the COVID-19 pandemic.104 The Third Circuit concluded that
“[g]iven the extraordinary circumstances . . . of the COVID-19 pandemic,
we are satisfied that their § 2241 claim seeking only release on the basis that
unconstitutional confinement conditions require it is not improper.”105 The
court acknowledged that there are “a narrow subset of actions that arguably
might properly be brought as either” habeas or civil rights actions because
the deprivation of rights are severe enough to impact the fact or duration of
detention.106 Additionally, the court explained that habeas provides a remedy
for non-prisoner detainees, which includes immigrant detainees.107 Although
the court tailored its decision to make conditions of confinement claims
cognizable under habeas “only in extreme cases,” it concluded that the
pandemic qualified as extreme.108 While this approach does not resolve the
circuit split, it provides federal courts with a simpler approach to immigrant
detainee habeas petitions that focuses on the core principle of habeas corpus.

102

Montoya-Galvez, supra note 100.
Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 324 (3d Cir. 2020).
104
Id. at 324–25 (concluding that immigrant detainees can challenge the conditions of
their confinement through habeas during the COVID-19 pandemic).
105
Id. Although the court acknowledged the appropriate use of habeas in this situation, it
ultimately reversed the district court’s temporary restraining order for immediate release due
to the failure of the immigrant detainees to show likelihood of success on the merits. Id. at
325–31.
106
Id. at 323 (quoting Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 540 (3d Cir. 2002)). Put another
way, “what if confinement itself is the unconstitutional ‘condition of confinement?’” Essien
v. Barr, 457 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1013–14 (D. Colo. 2020) (holding that an ICE detainee’s
conditions of confinement claim was cognizable through habeas corpus). In a nearly identical
case brought by four federal prisoners, the Sixth Circuit also established that “where a
petitioner claims that no set of conditions would be constitutionally sufficient the claim should
be construed as challenging the fact or extent, rather than the conditions, of the confinement.”
Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 838 (6th Cir. 2020).
107
Hope, 972 F.3d at 323–24 (pointing to § 2241(e), which restricts access to the writ by
enemy combatants, the court concluded “that[] where the exclusion in § 2241(e) does not
apply, the writ is available to immigration detainees like Petitioners here, who are not
challenging convictions or sentences.”).
108
Id. at 324–25.
103
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The pandemic’s unprecedented pervasiveness revived a circuit split on
the appropriate use of habeas corpus in the criminal legal process that has
been newly applied to the immigration detention context. Part II explores
potential underlying rationales motivating the federal courts to distinguish
between the appropriate uses of habeas corpus in the immigration context
and how such rationales may impact immigrant detainees’ substantive due
process rights.
II. IDENTIFYING AND CHALLENGING HIDDEN RATIONALES
In principle, Camp 3’s approach is the simplest for the federal courts to
adopt: when a petitioner is deprived of a constitutionally protected right in
custody, habeas is the appropriate remedy.109 However, federal district courts
that rely on the precedent set by Camps 1 and 2 within criminal adjudications
have not responded to immigrant petitions for release during the pandemic
with the same flexibility as the Third Circuit. In closely reviewing the
opinions of courts that classify immigrant habeas petitions during the
pandemic as conditions of confinement claims inappropriately brought
through habeas corpus petitions, elements of an underlying rationale become
evident. Though not explicitly stated, the courts may unconsciously
analogize these immigrant detainees to criminally incarcerated individuals.
As explained below, such an analogy may be improper given the civil nature
of immigration detention and the additional constitutional protections
afforded to civil detainees.
Structural similarities certainly exist between immigration detention
and criminal incarceration. Immigrant detainees wear prison uniforms and
are held in secured facilities while they wait for immigration courts to
adjudicate their immigration charges,110 and ICE regularly relies on local jails
and for-profit prisons to house immigrant detainees.111 When a federal
district court acknowledges these similarities, it draws on a well-accepted
practice in legal analysis: analogy.112 If judges use analogies in decision
making, however, they must see “the importance of structural similarities
109

Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Altaf Saadi, Maria-Elena De Trinidad Young, Caitlin Palter, Jeremias Leonel Estrada
& Homer Venters, Understanding US Immigration Detention: Reaffirming Rights and
Addressing Social-Structural Determinants of Health, 22 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 187, 189
(2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7348446/ [https://perma.cc/LNF494B6].
111
Id.
112
Linda L. Berger, A Revised View of the Judicial Hunch, 10 LEGAL COMMC’N &
RHETORIC: JALWD 1, 3 (2013) (suggesting that judicial intuition is derived from “recognition
of potentially parallel patterns and paths” and are “triggered by factual analogies as well as by
the use of metaphor and perspective.”).
110
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rather than being distracted by the similarities or differences in surface
features.”113 One critical difference exists between immigrant detainees and
criminally incarcerated individuals: an immigrant detainee is in civil
detention114 and is entitled to more constitutional protections than a prisoner
serving a criminal sentence.115 Immigration matters adjudicated by
immigration judges are largely kept out of federal courts,116 but surface-level
similarities between immigration detention and criminal incarceration appear
to influence how these federal courts treat the constitutional challenges to
immigration detention they adjudicate.
Part II focuses on two long-standing areas of confusion that came into
focus during the COVID-19 crisis: statutory limitations on prisoner litigation
being applied to immigrant detention and the effect of preconceived guilt in
immigration detention. This Part explores how analogizing between criminal
incarceration and immigration detention may actually limit an immigrant
detainee’s constitutional rights.
A. AVOIDING EXCESSIVE PRISONER LITIGATION

Over time, access to habeas for the criminally incarcerated has been
substantially limited by the AEDPA and PLRA. In 1948, prior to the passage
of these two statutes, Congress created 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which required
federal prisoners to file collateral challenges to their convictions first through
§ 2255 and in the jurisdiction in which they were sentenced.117
Section 2255’s purpose was to redistribute collateral challenges to a
prisoner’s conviction across districts rather than inundating the federal
districts with the most federal prisons.118 Although § 2255 was considered
distinct from habeas,119 the Supreme Court acknowledged that the statute was
meant to provide a remedy equivalent to habeas in breadth and substance.120
However, in 1996, Congress passed the AEDPA which created a one-year
113

Id. at 22.
Detention Management: Detention Statistics, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www
.ice.gov/detain/detention-management [https://perma.cc/C5V2-AG6D].
115
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) (concluding that due process
requires that pretrial detainees cannot be punished, while sentenced inmates can be punished
if it is not cruel and unusual).
116
Background on Judicial Review of Immigration Decisions, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Jun.
1, 2013), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/background-judicial-review
-immigration-decisions [https://perma.cc/G4PP-62CG].
117
Suspended Justice: The Case Against 29 U.S.C. § 2255’s Statute of Limitations, 129
HARV. L. REV. 1090, 1091 (2016).
118
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1952).
119
See id. at 220.
120
Id. at 217–18.
114
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statute of limitations for § 2255 motions121 and severely limited subsequent
challenges.122 If a federal prisoner failed to meet these requirements, they
could only access the writ of habeas corpus if the court found that “the
remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [their]
detention.”123 Similarly, Congress passed the PLRA in 1996 to channel all
conditions of confinement claims through a prison’s administrative remedy
process before a prisoner could file lawsuits in federal court.124 As a
consequence, prisoners were required to exhaust administrative remedies
before filing a lawsuit, even if no damages were available through
administrative action.125 However, immigrant detainees can still file habeas
petitions under the original habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, to which the
limiting principles of the AEDPA and PLRA should not apply.126
Immigrant detainees are not considered prisoners within the definition
of the PLRA and AEDPA.127 Yet two district courts in the Tenth Circuit cited
congressional limitations on habeas when denying petitions for immigrant
detainees seeking release.128 The District of Colorado reasoned that “release
from custody is . . . an extreme remedy, so Congress has been careful to
121

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).
See id. § 2255(h)(1)–(2) (requiring a panel of appellate judges to certify that either
there was a new, retroactive, rule of constitutional law to challenge the conviction or that new
evidence was discovered that demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that no
reasonable fact-finder would have found the prisoner guilty of the charge for which he or she
was confined).
123
Id. § 2255(e).
124
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,
prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.”).
125
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 733–34 (2001).
126
U.S. CTS., supra note 22, at 1.
127
The PLRA definition of prisoner is “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility
who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of
criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary
program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h) (emphasis added); see also Ojo v. I.N.S., 106 F.3d 680, 683
(5th Cir. 1997) (holding that because the PLRA does not reference immigrants in its
definitions and the “fact that Congress addressed immigration reform in the AEDPA and
IIRIRA, but not in the PLRA” demonstrates that immigrant detainees are not bound by the
PLRA); Shuhaiber v. Ill. Dep’t. of Corr., 980 F.3d 1167, 1169 (7th Cir. 2020) (same);
Agyeman v. I.N.S., 296 F.3d 871, 885–86 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); LaFontant v. I.N.S., 135
F.3d 158, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same). The Supreme Court also held that the AEDPA did not
deprive the court of jurisdiction over an immigrant detainee’s habeas petition. St. Cyr v. I.N.S.,
533 U.S. 289, 298–99 (2001).
128
Basri v. Barr, 469 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1066 (D. Colo. 2020); Gomez-Arias v. U.S.
Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 20-CV-00857, 2020 WL 6384209, at *2 (D.N.M. Oct. 30,
2020).
122
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circumscribe its use by the courts.”129 The court cautioned against expanding
the writ to include conditions of confinement claims because it would
“fundamentally change” what it defined as a “drastic remedy”130 that should
be limited to challenging arbitrary executive detention.131
Even if statutory limitations such as the PLRA and AEDPA were
applicable to immigrant detainees, the administrative pathways available for
immigrant detainees to challenge their confinement are fewer than those
available to the criminally incarcerated. For example, immigrant detainees
who are inadmissible or removable by reason of having committed a criminal
offense or engaging in terrorist activity are subject to mandatory detention.132
Immigrant detainees held in discretionary detention cannot be released on
less than a $1,500 bond133 and will only be released if an immigration judge
determines that the individual is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the
community.134 If an immigration judge denies an immigrant detainee bond,
an immigrant detainee may appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA)135—but must only exhaust that remedy if challenging the underlying
order of removal.136 The vast majority of immigrant detainees seeking release
from detention during the COVID-19 pandemic do not challenge their
underlying immigration charges, but instead assert their constitutional
substantive due process rights.137 Because immigrant detainees filing habeas
petitions during the pandemic are not prisoners and are not challenging their
underlying immigration charges, the justifications underlying congressional
limitations on access to habeas, such as those created by the PLRA and
AEDPA, are misapplied to immigrant detainees.

129

Basri, 469 F. Supp. 3d at 1066.
Id.
131
Id. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that
habeas protects against “the practice of arbitrary imprisonments, [which] have been, in all
ages, the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny.”).
132
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (requiring mandatory detention for criminal aliens); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226a(a)(1) (requiring mandatory detention of terrorist aliens).
133
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A).
134
BRYAN LONEGAN, LEGAL AID SOC’Y, IMMIGRATION DETENTION AND REMOVAL: A
GUIDE FOR DETAINEES AND THEIR FAMILIES 6 (2015), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/12/detentionremovalguide_2006-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/68JD-TK76].
135
Executive Office for Immigration Review Policy Manual, 9.3(f) Bond Proceedings:
Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-policy-manual/9/3 [https://
perma.cc/3H5R-464Q] (last updated Jan. 14, 2021).
136
8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).
137
See cases cited supra note 7.
130
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B. THE EFFECT OF PRECONCEIVED GUILT AND LACKING THE
RIGHT TO REMAIN

Certain courts—specifically those that differentiate between conditions
of confinement and fact or duration claims—may be uncomfortable releasing
immigrant detainees from confinement.138 Unlike criminally convicted
citizens, immigrant detainees are in custody because of a potential
immigration violation and, depending on the outcome of their immigration
adjudication, may not have a right to remain in the United States.139 An
unconscious discomfort with an immigrant’s violation of an immigration law
and potentially unlawful status may motivate some courts to deny habeas
petitions for release despite strong evidence of constitutional due process
violations within ICE facilities during the COVID-19 pandemic.
1. Federal District Courts May Assume the Guilt of Immigrant
Detainees
Simply because immigrants are detained, certain federal courts may
perceive them to already have been adjudged guilty140 and, therefore,
ineligible for release from confinement.141 On one end of the perceived guilt
spectrum is a case decided in the Southern District of Texas. The court denied
an immigrant detainee’s pandemic-related habeas petition because an
immigration judge ordered the petitioner removed after her asylum hearing
after concluding that she was a member of a Tier III terrorist organization.142
138

See, e.g., Ndudzi v. Perez, 490 F. Supp. 3d 1176, 1180 (S.D. Tex. 2020); Perez v. Wolf,
445 F. Supp. 3d 275, 284 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (noting that the immigrant detainee’s appeal to the
Board of Immigration Appeals had not yet been heard).
139
Removal, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/remove/removal [https://
perma.cc/H3VL-JLL7] (last updated Sept. 17, 2021) (noting that ICE enforcement and
removal operations remove noncitizen absconders from the United States).
140
Legal studies show that immigration courts may create a unique environment ripe for
the implicit bias of immigration judges to impact immigration adjudications. E.g., Fatma E.
Marouf, Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 417, 428 (2011).
Specifically, Marouf argues that an immigration judge’s lack of independence, inability to
engage in deliberate thinking due to a high caseload, low motivation due to high stress and
burnout, and the legally complex nature of the Immigration and Nationality Act make them
prone to the influence of implicit bias. Id. at 428–40.
141
In addition to immigrant detainees with final orders of removal, I am also referring to
immigrant detainees awaiting adjudication of their immigration charges.
142
Ndudzi, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 1181. Tier III terrorist organizations under the Immigration
and Nationality Act are “a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which
engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in” terrorist activity. Terrorism-Related
Inadmissibility Grounds (TRIG), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (last updated Nov. 19,
2019), https://www.uscis.gov/laws-and-policy/other-resources/terrorism-related-inadmissibi-
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The Southern District of Texas found that the immigration detainee was not
eligible for release because ICE can detain an immigrant ordered removed
for up to six months before the detainee can challenge their detention.143
While strong public safety arguments exist for mandatory detention of
immigrants found to support terrorist organizations, this case represents only
the extreme end of the guilt spectrum and should not serve as a baseline for
detaining the entire immigrant population. Although the petitioner remains
in detention, her detention is meant to be civil and free from punishment until
her sentenced punishment for violating U.S. immigration law—removal—
can be carried out.144
Conversely, in April 2020, the Northern District of California granted
an immigrant detainee’s motion for a temporary restraining order to be
immediately released from detention because of pandemic-related
concerns.145 Despite the fact that the petitioner was in removal proceedings
because he had five DUIs and presented a danger to the community, the court
found his release warranted because his continued detention constituted
punishment.146 The court explained that civil detention conditions amount to
punishment when (1) the conditions are expressly intended to punish or (2)
are excessive in relation to their non-punitive purpose and can be
accomplished by less harsh means.147 Because the facility conditions during
the COVID-19 pandemic were excessive in relation to the purpose of
detaining him for removal, his continued detention constituted punishment
and he was ordered released.148 Further, ICE could impose reasonable
conditions upon his release to ensure he did not pose a danger to the
community before his removal.149
Instead of focusing on his underlying immigration charges, the Northern
District of California evaluated the petitioner as a civil immigrant detainee

lity-grounds-trig [https://perma.cc/8G4H-LJYG]. Unlike Tier I and Tier II terrorist
organizations, which are formally designated by the Secretary of State, a Tier III terrorist
organization designation is made on a case-by-case basis in connection with the adjudication
of immigration charges. Id.
143
Ndudzi, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 1182; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001)
(adopting the presumption that the government can reasonably detain an immigrant detainee
for up to six months).
144
See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982) (holding that civil detainees are
“entitled to more considerate treatment . . . than criminals whose conditions of confinement
are designed to punish.”).
145
Perez v. Wolf, 445 F. Supp. 3d 275, 295 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
146
Id. at 294–95.
147
Id. at 294 (citing Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004)).
148
Id.
149
Id. at 295.
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awaiting adjudication of his immigration case and sought to ensure that his
detention remained free from punishment.150 This case highlights an often
forgotten aspect of immigration detention: immigration detention is civil
detention and therefore is not meant to punish.151 Instead, detention is
incidental to removal, which is the actual “sentence” of punishment for an
immigration violation. Because the detainee mentioned above had yet to
“serve” his sentence of removal, he was not at a stage in his proceedings
where punishment was constitutionally appropriate.
However, when an immigrant is detained for an immigration violation,
some courts appear to implicitly, but incorrectly, equate them to postconviction incarcerated individuals who, in our current criminal legal system,
pay their debt to society by serving their time.
2. Release of Immigrant Detainees Frustrates Removal
Some federal district courts may avoid releasing immigrant detainees
during the COVID-19 pandemic because immigrant detainees are detained
due to unlawful status, and—unlike United States citizens who are criminally
incarcerated—do not have a right to remain in the United States.
Furthermore, government officials in several cases have claimed that
releasing immigrants from detention could hinder the government’s ability
to remove them in the future.152 However, ICE allows for home confinement
through their Alternatives to Detention Division.153 This also includes GPS
monitoring of migrants’ cell phones who are released from detention to
ensure that migrants are in the cities to which border agents were told they
would be traveling.154 As of May 13, 2021, nearly 100,000 migrants had been
placed in ICE’s ATD programs.155 Although some circuits consider home

150

Id. at 294–95.
Removal, supra note 139.
152
E.g., Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836 (2018) (reasoning that detention
prevents “the risk of the alien’s either absconding or engaging in criminal activity before” a
decision about their immigration charges is made).
153
CONG. RSCH. SERV., IMMIGRATION: ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION (ATD) PROGRAMS
6–8 (2019) (overview of ICE programs for “non-detained aliens includ[ing] those released
from ICE custody on various types of orders, including orders of recognizance, parole, and
bond” which can include “face-to-face and telephonic meetings, unannounced visits to an
alien’s home, scheduled office visits by the participant with a case manager, and court and
meeting alerts” and “location monitoring via GPS.”).
154
Sandra Sanchez, Instead of Ankle Monitors, New App Helps Track Asylum-Seekers
Released in U.S., BORDER REP. (May 21, 2021, 4:33 PM), https://www.borderreport.com/
news/top-stories/new-app-instead-of-ankle-monitors-being-used-to-track-asylum-seekersreleased-in-us/ [https://perma.cc/PS6G-P3QR].
155
Id.
151
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confinement a “quantum change in the level of custody,”156 ICE’s technology
allows for effective enforcement and should not be considered a declaration
of an immigrant detainee’s right to remain in the United States.
Additionally, immigrant detainees seeking release due to COVID-19
conditions did not challenge their underlying immigration charges in an
attempt to remain in the United States. During the pandemic, immigrant
detainees filing habeas petitions sought temporary release to avoid the
potentially life-threatening implications of remaining in confinement. As
previously discussed, the REAL ID Act of 2005 greatly limited an immigrant
detainee’s ability to challenge final orders of removal, deportation, and
exclusion157 and placed that authority with the federal appeals courts, but did
not limit habeas challenges to length or conditions of immigration
detention.158 Yet some courts fault petitioners for failing to challenge the
“legality of their confinement” when filing habeas petitions during the
pandemic.159 For example, the Eastern District of Virginia concluded that
detained immigrants incorrectly brought a conditions of confinement
challenge through habeas based on their failure to challenge their underlying
immigration charges.160
This conclusion is unjustified for two reasons. First, the REAL ID Act
of 2005 already limits challenges to underlying immigration charges.161
Second, if immigrant detainees challenged their underlying immigration
charges in addition to their confinement, they would be proactively seeking
to remain in the United States—a reality these federal courts are clearly
uncomfortable with. Additionally, the plenary power doctrine limits the
judicial branch’s authority to review decisions made by Congress and the
Executive branch in furtherance of American immigration policy.162 The
Southern District of Texas recently stated it was not their job to “elucidate
the precise conditions of when detention is no longer necessary” when

156

Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1991).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).
158
See id. at § 1252(a)(2)(D).
159
E.g., Toure v. Hott, 458 F. Supp. 3d 387, 398 (E.D. Va. 2020); Basri v. Barr, 469 F.
Supp. 3d 1063, 1066–67 (D. Colo. 2020).
160
Toure, 458 F. Supp. 3d at 398.
161
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).
162
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889) (establishing that it is
within the federal government’s authority to exclude aliens); Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (holding that the federal government’s immigration authority
encompassed the power to deport).
157
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denying a petition for habeas corpus.163 In a similar immigration matter, the
D.C. District Court also acknowledged finding “these questions difficult to
answer.”164
Each of these factors demonstrates why the federal district courts may
avoid granting petitions that could prematurely infringe on the executive’s
prerogative to carry out the nation’s immigration policy. Whether an
immigrant detainee has been ordered to be removed or is still awaiting
adjudication, the federal courts risk undermining the constitutional
protections available for immigrants as civil detainees, if they defer to an
immigration judge’s decision and, explicitly or implicitly, liken immigrant
detainees to criminal prisoners already found guilty.
By analogizing the release of immigrant detainees under habeas to the
release of the criminally incarcerated, these courts may unnecessarily
confuse and distract themselves from the purpose of habeas corpus. In its
most principled form, the writ is meant to protect those in custody from
unlawful executive detention regardless of the type of detention. In
adjudicating immigrant detainee habeas petitions, federal district courts that
rely on Camps 1 and 2’s bright line division between conditions of
confinement and fact or duration claims may operate on a false analogy that
fundamentally misapplies the procedural restrictions on habeas corpus
petitions within the criminal legal system to immigrant detainees.
III. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES AND A NEW APPROACH
When change occurs in federal jurisprudence, unintended consequences
often follow. Federal courts have long deferred to the federal government’s
plenary power over immigration enforcement.165 As a result, if the judiciary
moves too far from analogizing immigration detention to criminal
incarceration, due process protections for immigrant detainees may be further
eroded.166 Immigration Courts are housed in the Executive Office for

163

Ndudzi v. Perez, 490 F. Supp. 3d 1176, 1183 (S.D. Tex. 2020); see also Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (“The Government’s interest in efficient administration of
the immigration laws at the border also is weighty.”).
164
O.M.G. v. Wolf, 474 F. Supp. 3d 274, 288 (D.D.C. 2020).
165
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned.”); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (same);
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972) (establishing the “facially legitimate and
bona fide” test, which reinforced the federal government’s authority to exclude aliens); Kerry
v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 104 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (same).
166
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889).
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Immigration Review, a Department of Justice subagency,167 which has
traditionally led the federal courts to treat the immigration system as sui
generis.168 Consistent with Congress’s regulatory scheme, the Supreme
Court interprets the naturalization power, and therefore authority over
immigration policy in the United States, as vested exclusively in Congress.169
By eliminating all analogies to the criminal legal system, the federal courts
risk further isolating the immigration system from the judiciary.
Part III first explores the potential consequences of the recent trend in
immigration-related decisions that apply a more flexible approach to due
process protections for immigrant detainees—namely allowing Congress to
set the due process procedures available to immigrant detainees and deferring
to the federal government’s plenary power over immigration law.170 This Part
then presents an alternative approach that, while imperfect, may provide an
analogy to the criminal adjudication and incarceration system that better
protects the constitutional rights of immigrant detainees.
A. THE DANGERS OF OVERCORRECTING

The federal government has the sovereign prerogative, or plenary
power, to set the procedures for entry into and exit out of the United States
within the immigration context, and courts have long held that immigrants
are only owed the due process set forth for them by Congress.171 Within the
immigration context, the Supreme Court has also acknowledged that “due
process is flexible” and “calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.”172 The government has a legitimate interest in
the enforcement of immigration laws173 because it gives “immigration
167

Executive Office for Immigration Review: About the Office, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office [https://perma.cc/NTN7-WE3Q] (last updated Feb.
3, 2021).
168
Latin for “of its own kind.” Sui generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
169
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also, United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 626
(1931) (those seeking to naturalize in the U.S. “must accept the grant and take the oath in
accordance with the terms fixed by the law, or forego the privilege of citizenship. There is no
middle choice.”).
170
Dep’t Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1964 (2020).
171
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned.”); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (same);
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972) (establishing “facially legitimate and bona
fide” test which reinforced the federal government’s authority to exclude aliens); Kerry v. Din,
576 U.S. 86, 104 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (same).
172
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 852 (2018) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972)); see also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982).
173
See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003).
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officials time to determine an alien’s status without running the risk of the
alien’s either absconding or engaging in criminal activity before a final
decision can be made.”174 Although ICE detainees have substantive due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment, the court must also weigh the
interest of the government in detaining the individual to carry out the nation’s
immigration policies.175 It appears that, as a result, some courts choose to
take a deferential position to the federal government’s plenary power over
immigration when denying habeas petitions for release from ICE
detention.176
In a July 2020 ruling that denied release to more than 200 noncitizen
parents and children detained in three ICE Family Residential Centers
(FRCs), the District of D.C. concluded that releasing the detainees would
“run contrary to the principle that a ‘district court should approach issuance
of injunctive orders’” with caution and “exercise its discretion if appropriate
by giving officials time to rectify the situation before issuing an
injunction.”177 The court acknowledged that a “district court’s equitable
power to redress constitutional injuries is broad,” but the Supreme Court
requires district courts to wait until local authorities attempt to remedy the
situation before imposing an injunction.178 In immigration cases, the local
authority is ICE, a subagency of the executive branch which is distinct from
the judiciary.179 When considering whether to grant a habeas petition for ICE
detainees at high risk of contracting COVID-19, the court “strike[s] a balance
between the gravity of the risk of contracting COVID-19 (with uncertain
outcomes for recovery and a path that could lead to death) with the danger to
the public that could result from releasing the petitioners into the
community.”180 Courts that deny immigrant detainees’ habeas petitions
appear to give more weight to the government’s interests in detention and

174

Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 836.
Landon, 459 U.S. at 34.
176
See, e.g., C.G.B. v. Wolf, 464 F. Supp. 3d 174, 212 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Benavides
v. Gartland, Civ. A. No. 20-46, 2020 WL 1914916, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 2020)); see also
O.M.G. v. Wolf, 474 F. Supp. 3d 274, 286–87 (D.D.C. 2020); Dawson v. Asher, No. C200409, 2020 WL 1704324, at *12 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 8, 2020).
177
O.M.G., 474 F. Supp. 3d at 289 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846–47
(1994)).
178
O.M.G., 474 F. Supp. 3d at 289.
179
Compare Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 820–21 (7th Cir. 2020) (concluding that courts
should defer to the expert judgment of correctional facility administrators in matters
implicating safety and security concerns), with Awshana v. Adducci, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1045,
1055 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (using very similar language when denying a petition for habeas
corpus to an ICE detainee).
180
Awshana, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 1056.
175
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avoidance of potential danger181 because releasing immigrant detainees could
be viewed as an imposition on the federal government’s authority over
immigration proceedings.
Substantial deference to immigration authorities, as compared to other
civil detention contexts, is not surprising given recent Supreme Court rulings
arising from cases in which immigrant detainees challenged their underlying
immigration charges through habeas.182 In Department of Homeland Security
v. Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court’s ruling pointed toward a sliding scale
of constitutional rights for immigrant detainees with an individual’s due
process rights increasing or decreasing depending on whether they entered
the country legally.183 This sliding scale of rights was developed within the
context of immigrant detainees challenging their underlying immigration
charges, not the constitutionality of their detention conditions—which is the
main point at issue during the COVID-19 pandemic.184
The subset of cases discussed in this Comment, however, address a
different matter. During the pandemic, immigrant detainees used habeas
corpus to assert their right to liberty as a means of survival. Prior to the
pandemic, the courts largely rejected an immigrant detainee’s use of habeas
corpus to seek release from confinement, but COVID-19 redefined an
immigrant detainee’s liberty interest as being impacted by the potential for
severe illness or death.185 Despite their unlawful presence, immigrant
detainees assert a recognized, substantive due process claim to
constitutionally-protected liberty interests.186 Courts evaluating these habeas
petitions are, in essence, assessing whether an individual’s right to life,
181

See, e.g., C.G.B., 464 F. Supp. 3d at 212 (quoting Benavides v. Gartland, Civ. A. No.
20-46, 2020 WL 1914916, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 2020)); see also O.M.G., 474 F. Supp. 3d
at 286–87; Dawson, 2020 WL 1704324, at *12.
182
See Dep’t Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1963 (2020) (rejecting
respondent’s attempt to use habeas corpus to seek “additional administrative review of his
asylum claim”); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 838 (2018) (respondent filed habeas
petition “alleging he was entitled to a bond hearing to determine whether his continued
detention was justified.”); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 514 (2003) (respondent filed habeas
petition challenging the constitutionality of his mandatory detention).
183
See Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1964; see also Demore, 538 U.S. at 523 (concluding
that despite aliens’ entitlement to due process of law in deportation proceedings, “detention
during deportation proceedings” is a “constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation
process.”).
184
See Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1963; Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 838; Demore, 538 U.S.
at 514.
185
See Gomez-Arias v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 20-CV-00857, 2020 WL
6384209, at *3 (D.N.M. Oct. 30, 2020) (concluding that there are no “conditions of
confinement that could adequately prevent” harm).
186
E.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
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liberty, or property are being deprived without due process of law.187 For
example, the District of Minnesota concluded that an immigrant detainee’s
claim was “not a request to change conditions of their confinement to lessen
the danger of the pandemic” but that the jail in which the ICE detainee was
held had “violated the Constitution” because it could not prevent a COVID19 outbreak “no matter the protective measures taken.”188 Therefore, the
substantive due process rights asserted by these detainees live at the core of
our legal system.
The sui generis approach to immigration adjudication has eroded the
due process protections available to immigrant detainees for years, and the
COVID-19 pandemic shined a light on the risk of further erosion should the
federal courts continue to reject the use of habeas petitions by immigrant
detainees seeking release from confinement as a result of unconstitutional
living conditions. If district courts broadly apply the limited due process
model from Thuraissigiam189 to a constitutional rights context for which it
was not created, courts risk eliminating any remaining liberty interest
protections for immigrant detainees. This was especially dangerous when
continued confinement posed a substantial risk of severe illness or death.
B. A BETTER ANALOGY: PRETRIAL DETENTION

The COVID-19 pandemic is a devastating reminder that the substantive
due process rights of immigrant detainees must be protected. Similar to the
Camp 3 circuits which recognize habeas as an appropriate vehicle through
which to challenge conditions of confinement, the Third Circuit also rejected
analogies to the criminal legal system and focused instead on the fundamental
aspects of the writ to address the horrors of COVID-19 in ICE detention.190
Several district courts also adopted this approach.191 For example, the
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U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Mohammed S. v. Tritten, No. 20-CV-783, 2020 WL 2750109, at *2 (D. Minn. May
27, 2020).
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Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1964.
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Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding that conditions of
confinement claims are cognizable under habeas); Brennan v. Cunningham, 813 F.2d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 1987) (same); Peralta v. Vasquez, 467 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2006) (same); Hope v.
Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2020).
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Gomez-Arias v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 20-CV-00857, 2020 WL
6384209, at *3 (D.N.M. Oct. 30, 2020) (holding that where a petitioner contends “that in light
of the pandemic he should be released from custody because there are no conditions of
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proceedings may be appropriate.”); Favi v. Kolitwenzew, No. 20-CV-2087, 2020 WL
2114566, at *6, *7 (C.D. Ill. May 4, 2020) (same); Vazquez Barrera v. Wolf, 455 F. Supp. 3d
330, 336 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (same).
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Western District of Louisiana reasoned that “[w]hen fact claims are
mentioned . . . conditions are indicators of the targeted harm: the
confinement itself.”192 However, the mere mention of the word “conditions”
does not result in a legitimate conditions of confinement claim. Supreme
Court jurisprudence separates “conditions claims” from “fact claims” by
considering (1) the nature of the claim and (2) the remedy requested.193 The
nature of the claim for immigrant detainees was that the confinement itself
was the harmful condition which entitled them to release. When confinement
conditions make continued detention unconstitutional, immigrant detainees
correctly asserted habeas corpus to defend their substantive due process
rights.194
Although some courts may understand Camp 3’s approach as principled
and logical, it may be hard for other courts to dislodge deeply ingrained
analogies to the criminal legal system when assessing immigrant detainee
habeas petitions, especially considering the large number of organizational
similarities between immigration detention and criminal incarceration. At the
other end of the spectrum, encouraging federal courts to avoid any analogy
to the criminal legal system risks permanently tipping the scale of judicial
deference toward ICE on immigration enforcement matters. A third
approach, however, may offer the federal courts a solution that both aligns
with habeas precedent and allows for protection of an immigrant detainee’s
substantive Fifth Amendment rights. This approach is to analogize immigrant
detainees to pretrial detainees in the criminal legal context.
Pretrial detainees, like civil detainees, are afforded more protections
than incarcerated prisoners under the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause.195 A pretrial detainee’s conditions of confinement violate the Fifth

192

Dada v. Witte, 20-CV-00458, 2020 WL 5510706, at *4 (W.D. La. Apr. 30, 2020); see
also Poree v. Collins, 866 F.3d 235, 242–43 (5th Cir. 2017).
193
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (“[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging
the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a
determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from imprisonment,
his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”).
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Gomez-Arias, 2020 WL 6384209, at *3 (holding that where a petitioner contends “that
in light of the pandemic he should be released from custody because there are no conditions
of confinement that could adequately prevent” constitutional violations, then “federal habeas
proceedings may be appropriate.”); Favi, 2020 WL 2114566, at *6, *7 (same); Vazquez
Barrera, 455 F. Supp. 3d at 336 (same).
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Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–37 (1979); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
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Amendment if they “amount to punishment”196 before “an adjudication of
guilt.”197 Conversely, a convicted prisoner can be punished after receiving
full due process of law so long as the punishment is not cruel and unusual.198
When the federal government takes someone into custody they assume
responsibility for an individual’s reasonable health, safety, and wellbeing.199
This responsibility is heightened when an individual in custody has yet to
receive due process of law because “pre-adjudication detainees retain greater
liberty protections than convicted ones.”200 As previously stated, conditions
of confinement for pretrial detainees constitute punishment if they are
excessive or unnecessary to accomplish their non-punitive purpose and can
be accomplished in a less harsh manner.201 Deliberate disregard of the
medical needs of those in custody constitutes excessive punishment.202
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause to apply “to
all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”203 Immigrants
in detention are civil detainees who have not been convicted of a crime; as
with pretrial detainees, their conditions of confinement violate the Fifth
Amendment if they “amount to punishment”204 before “an adjudication of
196
Bell, 441 U.S. at 535; see also Hardy v. District of Columbia, 601 F. Supp. 2d 182,
188 (D.D.C. 2009) (concluding that pretrial criminal detainees have not been convicted of any
present crime, they “may not be subjected to punishment of any description.”) (quoting Hill
v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992)).
197
Bell, 441 U.S. at 535.
198
Id. at 535 n.16 (concluding that due process requires that pretrial detainees cannot be
punished, while sentenced inmates can be punished as long as it is not cruel and unusual).
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DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989);
see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (concluding that the government has
an obligation to safeguard the physical security of those it incarcerates); Hernandez Roman v.
Wolf, 829 F. App’x. 165, 172 (9th Cir. 2020) (upholding a preliminary injunction and ruling
that the government had likely failed to meet its “constitutional duty to provide reasonably
safe conditions” to immigrant detainees within the Adelanto ICE detention facility).
200
Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 535–36)
(“[A]n individual detained awaiting civil commitment proceedings is entitled to protections at
least as great as those afforded to . . . an individual accused but not convicted of a crime.”).
201
Id. (finding that where an individual is detained awaiting civil commitment in a
“condition identical to, similar to, or more restrictive than, those in which his criminal
counterparts are held, we presume that the detainee is being subjected to ‘punishment.’”).
202
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (concluding that deliberate disregard of a
prisoner’s medical needs constitutes excessive punishment under the Eighth Amendment).
203
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
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Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); see also Hardy v. District of Columbia,
601 F. Supp. 2d 182, 188 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th
Cir. 1992) (concluding that because pretrial criminal detainees have not been convicted of any
present crime, they “may not be subjected to punishment of any description.”)).
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guilt.”205 During the COVID-19 pandemic, immigrant detainees seeking
habeas relief argued that the high COVID-19 infection rate, combined with
ICE’s inadequate prevention measures, amounted to punishment.206
Therefore, ICE detention deprived them of a constitutional right to which
they were entitled while in civil detention.
Since immigrant detainees are, similar to pretrial detainees, in a state of
limbo (either awaiting adjudication of their cases or removal from the United
States), habeas is one of the few avenues through which they can seek relief
for constitutional violations of their rights to personal health and safety.
Several federal district courts reason that immigrant detainees petitioning for
release during the pandemic could advance claims that would “directly bear[]
on not just [their] conditions of confinement, but whether the fact of [their]
confinement is constitutional in light of the conditions caused by the COVID19 pandemic.”207 Recall that Preiser left open the possibility that habeas was
appropriate even “[w]hen a prisoner is put under additional and
unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody.”208 Although immigrant
detainees are lawfully detained in relation to their immigration charges, the
pandemic creates additional “unconstitutional restraints” that allows them to
“patently” challenge the validity of their confinement,209 which is the
province of habeas corpus.210 Some federal district courts justified decisions
to release immigrant detainees by using the opening left by Preiser to apply
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the framework of pretrial detention, thus redefining conditions of
confinement claims during the pandemic.211
Even if an immigrant detainee is ordered removed, detention is
incidental to removal; the sentence of deportation has yet to be carried out,
and therefore detention should not be analogized to a prison sentence.
Additionally, immigrant detainees awaiting adjudication of their immigration
charges should not be analogized to incarcerated individuals just because
they are in custody. Even when immigrant detainees are subject to mandatory
detention for criminal offenses, many have already served their sentences for
criminal convictions prior to arriving in immigration detention,212 and, for
immigration purposes, are the equivalent of recently detained, pretrial
detainees awaiting adjudication of their immigration charges. As such, they
have a constitutional right to pretrial-equivalent due process protections.
Of course, the federal courts do not have an unlimited ability to release
individuals in any type of detention. A pretrial detainee’s due process rights
must be balanced against the government’s legitimate interest in keeping the
individual detained213 which requires courts to strike a balance between the
government’s needs and the individual’s constitutional rights.214 As the
courts traditionally defer to the federal government’s plenary power in
immigration matters, courts often weigh institutional need more heavily.215
As such, some district courts have limited their grants for release of
immigrants during COVID-19 to situations where a petitioner’s condition—
whether due to age or preexisting condition—is such that continued
confinement would be “excessive in relation to the purpose of [their]
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See, e.g., Favi, 2020 WL 2114566, at *6 (“While a ‘run-of-the-mill’ condition of
confinement claim may not touch upon the fact or duration of confinement, here, Petitioner is
seeking immediate release based upon the claim that there are essentially no conditions of
confinement that are constitutionally sufficient given the facts of the case.” (quoting
Hernandez v. Kolitwenzew, Case No. 20-CV-2088, Order, d/e 12 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2020)));
Bent, 445 F. Supp. 3d at 413 (same); Vazquez Barrera, 455 F. Supp. 3d at 337 (same).
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Many Years in Detention, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/
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detention.”216 As more information about COVID-19 becomes available, ICE
detention facilities alter their practices, and vaccines are distributed, some
courts are less inclined to challenge the government’s interest in keeping
immigrants detained.217
The rights traditionally afforded to pretrial detainees and civil detainees
are compatible. Although use of this analogy still poses a risk of federal
judges analogizing to the incarceration of criminally convicted individuals,
it compares immigrant detainees to a more compatible stage in the criminal
adjudication process and requires a more robust review of potential
constitutional violations. It also encourages federal courts to move past the
confusion caused by the immigration adjudication system, and instead apply
a principled approach to habeas which, at its core, defends the constitutional
rights of those in custody.
CONCLUSION
The immigration adjudicatory system is largely kept separate from
judicial review. Lack of exposure to immigration adjudications may
unnecessarily confuse federal courts and result in them analogizing the
immigration system to the criminal legal system when adjudicating due
process claims. By definition, however, immigration detention is civil
detention, and civil detention is severely limited in any other context in the
American legal system. If federal courts are encouraged to use the tools made
available to them by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Preiser, they will have
the flexibility necessary to strengthen immigrant access to habeas corpus and
maintain basic due process right protections.
Many courts have limited the release of immigrant detainees to elderly
immigrants or those with preexisting medical conditions. However, it is
apparent that COVID-19 has long-term health implications for many,
including those of all ages (with or without co-morbidities).218 As a result,
immigration advocates increasingly used Preiser to fight for the temporary
216
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2114566, at *2 (C.D. Ill. May 4, 2020).

2022]

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS

405

release of all those in custody. Likening immigration detainees to pretrial
detainees is not a perfect analogy, but it provides the foundation necessary
for district courts to grant habeas petitions in this instance without fear of
upsetting the immigration system. Reliance on the pretrial detention analogy
also has the dual benefit of protecting the well-being of immigrant detainees,
while also opening the door to a new way of thinking about the substantive
due process rights of immigrant detainees which can be applied well beyond
the pandemic crisis. Many immigrant detainees who filed habeas petitions in
response to the pandemic have been and will continue to be removed from
the United States, but the analogy to pretrial detention encourages a return to
the historic purpose of the writ of habeas corpus: to protect against unlawful
detention.

